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Abstract. One of the goals of artificial life in the arts is to develop
systems that exhibit creativity. We argue that creativity per se is a con-
fusing goal for artificial life systems because of the complexity of the
relationship between the system, its designers and users, and the cre-
ative domain. We analyse this confusion in terms of factors affecting
individual human motivation in the arts, and the methods used to mea-
sure the success of artificial creative systems. We argue that an attempt
to understand creative agency as a common thread in nature, human
culture, human individuals and computational systems is a necessary
step towards a better understanding of computational creativity. We de-
fine creative agency with respect to existing theories of creativity and
consider human creative agency in terms of human evolution. We then
propose how creative agency can be used to analyse the creativity of
computational systems in artistic domains.
1 Introduction
1
Both artificial intelligence (AI) and artificial life (Alife) have been used to
study artistic creativity and to create new forms of art. Traditionally, AI has
focused on the artificial simulation of human intellectual capacities, whereas
Alife takes its inspiration from the creative power of nature through processes
such as self-organisation, natural selection and autonomy. The study of Alife
therefore holds special significance for the arts due to its inherent concern with
creativity beyond human agency, paying special attention to systems that exhibit
the emergence of new, higher-level primitives in a system de novo [1]. Despite
these differences of focus, in both approaches artificial creativity is a commonly
stated goal, whether represented as a means for better understanding human
creativity, creativity in general, or towards new systems for artists. But although
the intent is clear, a perspicuous definition of this goal or means of objective
measurement remains conspicuously hazy. As Saari and Saari put it, “Creativity
is fascinating! We know so much about the topic without having the slightest
idea what it is” [2, p. 79]. Such expressions of frustration are not uncommon
in the literature, and indeed, creativity shares in this a certain property with
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life: we are sure that we know it when we see it, but we don’t quite know how
stable such certainty might remain in the light of advances in the sciences of the
artificial.
Our motivation is a lack of focus on agency in the literature on creativity.
We argue that a better understanding of creative agency will help clarify the
goals of achieving creative behaviour in computational systems.
2 Defining Creative Agency
A typical definition of creativity (e.g. [3]) is as follows:
Definition 1. A system is creative if it produces novel and valuable (appropri-
ate, useful) output.
Understandably, the novelty and value of the output of a system have been
predominant areas of interest in the literature on creativity. In this paper we turn
to the process of production itself: the relationship between subject (the system)
and object (the output). We address this relationship in terms of what we call
creative agency : the extent to which the subject is responsible for producing the
object.
Definition 2. The creative agency of a system is the degree to which it is re-
sponsible for a creative output.
Identifying creative agency therefore involves the (apparently subjective)
evaluation of responsibility. It is not the output itself that we are interested
in, but the creativity of the output, in other words, the intangible qualities of
novelty and value. Thus a master artist could employ skilled students to create a
work, not once touch the work, but still be attributed with the creative agency of
the work. By the same reasoning, a wealthy patron commissioning such a work
could take some credit for making the work come about, but their choice to
employ a reputed artist would be to borrow already existing creativity. Creative
agency clearly relates to concepts of autonomy and adaptiveness. However, we
prefer not to pin creative agency to any of these terms explicitly, because, as
discussed in the following section, it can be associated with quite diverse struc-
tures and processes, including the process of natural evolution. A natural process
can be thought of as an invisible hand, but is not a tangible entity in the sense
in which we think of an autonomous system. Adaptiveness implies adaptation
to fulfil a need, so again, natural evolution’s blind creative ‘search’ is not itself
adaptive (although populations certainly adapt to environments). While it is
tempting to think of creative agency as being directly dependent on the extent
to which a system is capable of appropriately evaluating the output (following
the reasoning that responsibility for a creation requires awareness), this needn’t
be the case.
In computational creativity, the problem of creative agency is often taken as
being of secondary importance to the novelty and value of the output produced
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by a system. A lack of attention to the nature of creative agency is common
when discussing creativity in humans, because it is generally taken as given that
humans are the only kind of creative agent we need consider. In the case of
computational creativity, however, this can be a source of opacity, since we can-
not directly translate the notion of creative production that applies to humans
straight onto computational systems. Computational systems have a completely
different relationship to their environments from people. Not least, they are in-
variably brought into the world by human design. By highlighting this relation-
ship, computational creativity throws into light the problem of creative agency
not only in computational systems, but also in human and natural systems.
An understanding of creative agency has a clear role in the evaluation of
creativity in computational systems. It would be misleading to discuss the output
of a system without considering the relative contribution of the elements involved
in producing that output. Systems that exhibit a low degree of creative agency
make a smaller genuine contribution to the novelty and value of the output they
are involved in producing; in such cases the creative agency should instead be
attributable to the designer of the system. A system that has a high degree of
creative agency, on the other hand, should have a greater claim to the novelty or
value identified in any output produced by that system. If the output is indeed
creative (to be determined separately) then by virtue of its greater contribution
to that output, the system itself can be deemed creative. In short: novelty and
value that cannot be directly attributed to the computational system should
have no weight in supporting claims about the creativity of that system.
We can think of the assignment of creative agency to computational systems
as akin to assigning royalties to a collection of artists who collaborated on a
creative work – the greater their original contribution to the the output, the
higher the attribution of creative agency.
A simplified representation of the problem of creative agency is shown in
Figure 1. Agency and creativity are placed on distinct axes (without necessarily
implying that they are independent), and we consider two hypothetical compu-
tational systems. System A has a high degree of agency but does not produce
particularly creative output, whereas System B’s output is highly creative even
though the system itself is not particularly responsible for the creativity of that
output. The diagonal line represents a hypothesised limit of current systems. At
present, designers of computationally creative systems are forced to find compro-
mises between systems of type A and systems of type B, but one of the ultimate
goals of computational creativity is to find systems that exhibit the agency of
System A, but with true creative output as in System B.
Thus, on the one hand we can create systems that act as generative proxies for
our own creativity, but that are not themselves the source for the creativity evi-
dent in the output (like System B). An example of this is Harold Cohen’s Aaron
painting system, which embodies a detailed set of rules encoded by Cohen[4].
Aaron acts as a sort of cognitive tool for Cohen, mass-producing variations on
an artistic theme overnight, for Cohen to sift through in the morning. Aaron
extends Cohen’s creative output in novel ways, but it remains low on the agency
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axis: it is clear that Aaron’s agency is limited, as the program inhabits a tightly
restricted space of picture styles and is in no way adaptive to its environment.
On the other hand, we can attempt to increase agency by developing systems
that do not explicitly embody our own design decisions. This is a challenging
problem and, according to the hypothesised limit in Figure 1, is likely to ren-
der the output of the system less creative. It is particularly important to note
that whilst the former approach can be clearly stated as a problem in cogni-
tive science, the latter spills open into social and artistic domains of enquiry by
prompting discussions of authorship and the social reception of creative work.
The recent DrawBots project has started to address such questions by attempt-
ing to produce a robot artist that was the true author of its artistic output, but
achieves only a ‘minimal creativity’ [5].
In the remaining sections, we will expand on the relationship between cre-
ative agency and social behaviour. This leads us to a view of creativity as a
process operating over a variety of distinct levels, between which value provides







current limit between agency and creativity
Target
Fig. 1. Graph representing a hypothesised limit to the combination of agency and
creativity in current computationally creative systems.
3 Creative Agency in Humans and Natural Systems
The human species is eminently capable of introducing novel structures into the
world, and the same is patently true of nature. Adopting a universal approach,
the Alife perspective on creativity might well question the individualistic origins
of much creativity. Since we would not expect to identify the creative agency
of nature in the random mutations of genetic variation, it would be reasonable
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to suspect that the creative agency of culture as a whole is greater than the
sum of the creative agencies of individual humans. A number of contemporary
trends in human evolutionary theory have expounded this argument. Meme the-
ory, for example, proposes that cultural behaviour can be explained in terms
equivalent to genetic theory, by positing the meme as an abstract cultural repli-
cator [6]. Memeticists are at pains to stress that this is not merely a theoretical
construction by analogy, but constitutes a proper Darwinian formulation of cul-
ture. Thus beyond their replicating qualities and a process of selection, memes
and genes needn’t have anything in common; meme propagation should be un-
derstood as having radically different properties to gene propagation, including
the potential for horizontal and oblique transmission between carriers, different
rules for survival and extinction, a completely different mechanics of variation
and recombination, and completely different rules for coinhabitation in the same
carrier. The meme’s mechanism for variation and recombination is, in fact, what
we’d typically think of as human creativity, so meme theory provides one way
of thinking about human creativity as a subroutine in a greater algorithm for
creativity at a cultural level, albeit far more powerful than random mutation. As
Newton put it, he could see so far only because he was standing on the shoulders
of giants.
A related approach to cultural evolution is that of Boyd and Richerson, who
hypothesise that the human capacity for culture is a powerful adaptive product
of the benefits to the individual of social learning, but with this generally ben-
eficial adaptation comes the potential for much irrelevant behaviour to become
amplified and embedded in stable structures [7]. These structures are what we
refer to as culture, and can be viewed as a kind of evolutionary baggage; much
of it may well be adaptive, but not necessarily so. Some have suggested that as-
pects of culture as powerful as language could indeed be understood as parasitic
[6]. Boyd and Richerson liken cultural evolution to the runaway evolutionary
dynamics identified in sexual selection. Henrich and Gil-White extend Boyd and
Richerson’s model to incorporate a theory of prestige as a mechanism that could
drive the emergence and reinforcement of exotic cultural behaviours in a tight
positive feedback loop: as individual fitness becomes increasingly dependent on
socially determined factors, human behaviour becomes increasingly de-coupled
from is ecological foundations, and self-determining [8].
4 The Importance of Levels
Such theories of bio-cultural coevolution are relevant to our discussion of creative
agency because they offer a compelling explanation for the emergence of those
creative domains that appear to have only a tentative functional relationship
to human survival, namely, the arts and music [9]. Although remaining a spec-
ulative field, it points to the need for a multi-layered model of creativity that
unifies individual creativity with super-individual cultural processes responsible
for driving the emergence of creative domains themselves. The need for distin-
guishing creativity on different levels is also driven at the sub-individual level
5
by the perspective in cognitive science typified by Andy Clark’s Extended Mind
hypothesis, which postulates that cultural artefacts offer cognitive cybernetic
enhancement [10]. According to this point of view human creative agency is
already a highly distributed network of elements with human brains at the cen-
tre (for the time being), and computational systems can be understood as active
contributors to the creative processes of individuals. This distributed model com-
plements the point of view that the brain itself is a distributed set of functional
units, as typified by the Swiss Army-knife model of mental modularity, pro-
posed by Barkow, Cosmides and Tooby as a central foundation for the empirical
study of evolutionary psychology [11]. Theorists of creativity have revisited this
point of view in different ways, most notably Arthur Koestler’s metaphor of the
Janus-Faced Holon [12].
Considering creative agency allows us to distinguish between creative pro-
cesses operating at different layers. As the above discussion reveals, carving the
world into distinct creative agents at different levels is an inherently difficult
task, in much the same way as identifying units of selection in evolution, or
trying to state precisely what a meme is. Accepting creative agency on differ-
ent levels complicates the centrality of individual human creative agency, but
it offers a better distinction on forms of creativity in both cultural processes
and computational systems. We turn now to consider how traditional views of
creativity work in this multi-layer model.
5 A Layered View of Traditional Dimensions of
Creativity
Creativity theorist Csikszentmihalyi sees novelty and value as the cornerstones
of creativity: something can’t be creative if it has been done before, but mere
banal or inappropriate novelty does not qualify as creativity [13]. Creativity
occurs when people find new ways to achieve goals. For Csikszentmihalyi, the
problem of defining value in the attribution of creativity necessitates a view
centred on the embeddedness of individuals within creative domains:
There is no way to know whether a thought is new except with reference
to some standards, and there is no way to tell whether it is valuable
until it passes social evaluation. Therefore, creativity does not happen
inside people’s heads, but in the interaction between a person’s thoughts
and a sociocultural context. It is a systemic rather than an individual
phenomenon. [13, p.23]
Csikszentmihalyi therefore defines a creative person as “someone whose
thoughts or actions change a domain, or establish a new domain” (p28). Since
modifying a domain influences the way that domain will respond to future po-
tential creativity, individual and domain are strongly interdependent. Csikszent-
mihalyi’s characterisation of the relationship between individual and domain
extends naturally to a general relationship between creative agency at differ-
ent levels, that has an unmistakably Darwinian, or perhaps more appropriately
6
ecosystemic, feel. The creativity of certain individuals is determined by processes
occurring at a higher level (the creative domain), mediated by the generation
of a system of value. This is Darwinian in that a higher level process selectively
filters elements being produced and reproduced at lower levels. The system of
value, like the Darwinian concept of fitness, is implicit and mostly revealed in
hindsight.
Novelty itself must also be seen as domain specific if it is to have any non-
trivial meaning. Trivially, everything that is different is novel. It is less trivial,
and far more meaningful, to measure the degree of novelty of things. But mea-
surement occurs in a metric space, and metric spaces are not real things, but
are constructed by perceiving agents. This is not a problem for creativity per se:
novelty is our evidence for creativity, but creative systems don’t need to recognise
novelty to be creative. This suggests that novelty-seeking alone may have little
functional utility. Some human cultures, such as Western industrialised society,
seem to have fostered neophilia, forging an inherent link between novelty and
value. It is far from evident that this has any functional utility, however [14].
Boden discusses the cognitive requirements for humans to find new ways to
achieve goals, distinguishing between three kinds of creative process: combina-
torial creativity is the combination of existing elements to create new elements;
exploratory creativity is search through an existing conceptual space; and trans-
formational creativity is the transformation of an existing conceptual space. A
problem for the precise application of Boden’s theoretical work has been the for-
mulation of what these conceptual spaces actually are [15], particularly with re-
spect to understanding how transformational creativity differs from exploratory
creativity [15, 16]. Viewing creativity at multiple levels allows us to hypothesise
that transformational creativity is really a process occurring at the higher cul-
tural level, for example in the way described by Kuhn in his theory of scientific
revolutions [17].
6 Categorising Agency in Computational Creativity
The multilevel approach to creativity helps to identify three distinct ways in
which computational systems can exhibit creative agency. The first is by ac-
tively contributing to the creative agency of individual humans, as an active
component in a distributed creative process. Most computationally creative sys-
tems to date fit this category, although they may be at odds with their designers’
original goals of establishing human-like creativity. This adheres to the extended
mind perspective that our individual creativity is already highly distributed and
enhanced by cultural artefacts, some of which may be computational systems
performing complex tasks. We already use computers creatively, but their role in
our individual creativity is creeping towards an increasingly active status. Pro-
grams like Cohen’s Aaron, and the general increase in popularity of generative
art demonstrate how this shift is taking place.
Disappointingly, the predominant tool of Alife-based art – the interactive
genetic algorithm (IGA) [18] – has had limited success as a tool for enhancing
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creativity. The IGA aims at fixing the problem of formally defining complex
human aesthetic preferences by letting humans take the place of the fitness
function, but this arguably leads to a poor creative partnership where both user
and algorithm assume roles of little creative agency. The genetic algorithm is
passive in that it relies on the user for the crucial step of selection, but the user
is rendered passive by being unable to control the long-term course of evolution or
the underlying structure of the developmental process. Nevertheless, interactive
genetic algorithms are beginning to emerge in commercially available creative
software where their use makes sense. Dahlstedt’s Mutasynth, for example, assists
a user to search a vast space of possible synthesiser sounds using an IGA with
visual representation of synthesis parameter space [19]. Anyone who has played
with a synthesiser will be familiar with the mild sensation of blind search already
inherent the mapping from parameters to sounds.
The second approach is to consider how computational systems can fit into
existing processes at the higher cultural level. These systems need to identify
how individual interactions lead to social structures and cause cultural change.
Pockets of research have been conducted in this area, which, as discussed, span a
variety of disciplines. The DrawBots project attempted to accentuate the social
construction of a robotic art system’s creative agency as far as possible by allow-
ing its creations to be exhibited in an art gallery without human intervention,
illustrating the potentially vast variety of ways creative agents might manipulate
creative domains. This includes the potential circularity hinted at by Henrich
and Gil-White [8], that perhaps the legitimisation of the art gallery is enough to
make the work acceptable to a receptive audience. That said, if, in hindsight, the
robot did have an impact on its creative domain in this way, the sticky problem
is that the agency of this particular act (putting the work into the gallery) falls
yet again to the human agent that curated the event.
Romero, Machado and Santos’ ongoing Hybrid Society project aims to build
a virtual social system coinhabited by human and computer artists, all operat-
ing as both producers and critics and interacting in social networks such that
the real artistic value systems of the humans influence the world of the artificial
agents [20]. In principle, in such an environment (as with DrawBots), agents may
potentially influence the creative domain of human participants. By Csikszent-
mihalyi’s definition, nothing could provide a better indication of creative agency
than this.
Earlier Alife style models, based completely in silico (e.g. [21–23]) have al-
ready established the potential of exploring basic cultural or bio-cultural dy-
namics using multi-agent systems, yet it is hard to ground those dynamics in
a way that produces anything we would recognise as creative (novel, yes, but
of any aesthetic interest, no!). This overlaps smoothly with our third suggested
approach, which is to work out how to exploit the creative potential already
under investigation in in silico research in Alife, but in artistic domains. A pi-
oneering example of such research is the Italian composer Agostino di Scipio’s
musical performances, which work by building sonic ecosystems that transform
the latent sound of the performance space into musical works using a series of
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complex variations on the process of audio feedback [24]. Di Scipio’s insight is
to begin with the medium that he is interested in, and construct complex net-
works of processes within that domain (sound itself). In other artistic domains,
elements from Alife can be used more literally, such as Jon McCormack’s in-
stallation, Eden, which presents a population of artificial learning agents whose
environment is ‘fed’ by the presence of audience members, who are lured to stay
in the installation space by the agent’s ability to create interesting music [25].
Eden creates an evolving symbiotic relation between the audience and artifi-
cial agents. In these domains, creative emergence can occur that is inherent to
the environment defined by the work, and as such, the works do achieve creative
agency, without conflicting with the creative achievements of the artists involved
in making them. This is what Whitelaw refers to as metacreation [26].
7 Conclusion
In this paper, we have argued, for purely practical reasons of evaluation, the
need to consider the creative agency of systems that are involved in producing
a creative output. Although we believe that this focus will help to clarify the
goals of computational creativity and the potential role of Alife in this domain,
our contribution does not take the form of a mathematical definition of creative
agency which could be easily applied by researchers to various creative systems.
Instead, it appears necessary that assigning creative agency will continue to be
a subjective matter based on disparate evidence. Our goal has been to attempt
to form an appropriate perspective with which to simultaneously view creative
processes in nature, human culture, individual human behaviour and existing
computationally creative systems. We have argued for a perspective that recog-
nises creative agency and the role of value in mediating between levels in a
hierarchy of creative processes. This replaces the dominance of the human indi-
vidual as the exemplary creative agent with a more distributed set of interacting
elements into which computational systems can more easily situate themselves.
We propose that this clarifies the potential creative role of Alife systems in the
cultural domain of the arts. Such a perspective can ultimately lend itself to more
detailed numerical analysis of creativity, however, further discussion combining
sociological, philosophical and Alife-based reasoning will be needed before this
can be achieved.
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